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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
this era of supermarkets and shopping centers; and under the holding
of the principal case, they are certainly of questionable validity without
such a saving clause.
C. EDWIN ALLMAN, JR
Specific Performance-Oral Contracts to Devise-
Statute of Frauds.
In a recent Kentucky decision,' an illegitimate daughter brought suit
against her father's estate on his oral promise to devise real property to
her in consideration of her mother's foregoing the institution of bastardy
proceedings against him. The trial court held the oral contract un-
enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, but awarded damages on the
basis of quantum wieruit, measured by the value of the property promised
to be devised. On appeal, the court of appeals remanded with direc-
tions to enter a decree for specific performance of the contract if the
property was still vested in the heirs of the decedent and still available
for transfer to the plaintiff.
Uniformly, it is held that oral contracts to devise realty are within
the section of Statute of Frauds relating to contracts for the transfer
of real property.2 However, the majority of jurisdictions will grant
specific performance of the contract on the theory of part performance
where there has been a performance by the promisee which is incapable
of monetary evaluation.3 The rationale of these courts is that the Statute
of Frauds, which was designed to prevent fraud, should not be used to
perpetuate a fraud and that the equity of the promisee who has performed
in reliance upon the oral contract requires the specific deliverance of the
thing promised.4
Prior to the decision in the principal case Kentucky had repudiated
the doctrine of part performance as taking the oral contract out of the
'Miller v. Miller, 335 S.W2d 884 (Ky. 1960).2 E.g., Pocius v. Fleck, 13 Ill. 2d 420, 150 N.E2d 106 (1958); Griggs v. Oak,
164 Neb. 296, 82 N.W.2d 410 (1957); Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d
164 (1958); Hill v. Luck, 201 Va. 586, 112 S.E2d 858 (1960); 49 Am. JUn.
Statute of Frauds §215 (1943).
'Jones v. Adams, 67 Idaho 402, 182 P2d 963 (1947) ; Jatcko v. Hoppe, 7 Ill. 2d
479, 131 N.E.2d 84 (1956); Betterly v. Granger, 350 Mich. 651, 87 N.W.2d 330(1957); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956) ;
Patton v. Patton, 201 Va. 705, 112 S.E2d 849 (1960). The courts have varied
widely in terminology and in description of the particular acts necessary to take
the oral contract out of the statute. See Parker v. Solomon, 171 Cal. App. 2d
125, 340 P.2d 353 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (equitable estoppel) ; Hurd v. Ball, 128
Ind. App. 278, 143 N.E.2d 458 (1957) (fraud). See generally Annot., 101 A.L.R.
923 (1936); Comment, 36 U. DET. LJ. 316 (1959).
' Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950) ; Anselmo v. Beard-
more, 70 Idaho 392, 219 P.2d 946 (1950) ; Gladville v. McDole, 247 Ill. 34, 93 N.E.
86 (1910); Gossett v. Harris, 48 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
[Vol. 39
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Statute.5 North Carolina," Mississippi7 and Tennessee8 have also re-
jected the doctrine of part performance. The question -arises whether
the reasoning used by the Kentucky court in reversing its position would
be persuasive if and when the North Carolina Supreme Court is faced
with the problem presented by the instant case. In examining this
question it is necessary to consider the rules existing in Kentucky at
the time of the decision as compared with the present North Carolina
holdings.
Kentucky has held that, although the oral contract is unenforceable,
the party performing the contract is entitled to recover the reasonable
value of his services, where they are capable of monetary evaluation. 9
Where the performance by the promisee was not susceptible of monetary
evaluation, Kentucky had awarded the party performing the value of
the land promised to be devised.' 0 In the instant case the Kentucky
court concluded that awarding the plaintiff the value of the land promised
to be devised but refusing to give the plaintiff the land itself was unrea-
sonable and illogical. The court stated:
Where the statute of frauds is so circumvented as to allow proof
of the terms of an oral contract and recovery of the value of the
property agreed to be devised or conveyed then to say that 'though
the thing itself cannot be recovered nor the contract specifically
enforced' . . . because the statute is still applicable is pure sophis-
try.... Originating in-Victorian circumlocution, the fiction does
not measure up to the practical requirements of justice and com-
mon sense.1"
'Vest v. Searce's Adm'r, 312 Ky. 181, 226 S.W2d 942 (1950) ; Rudd v. Planters
Bank & Trust Co., 283 Ky. 351, 141 S.W2d 299 (1940); Bowling v. Bowling's
Adm'r, 222 Ky. 396, 300 S.W. 876 (1927) ; Doty's Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, 118
Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803 (1904) ; Grant v. Craigmiles, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 203 (1808).Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958) ; Stewart v. Wyrick, 228
N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d 764 (1947); Daughtry v. Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27 S.E.2d
446 (1943) ; Price v. Askins, 212 N.C. 583, 194 S.E. 284 (1937). For earlier dis-
cussions of quantum ineruit in North Carolina as a basis of recovery where the
oral contract is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds see Notes, 1 N.C.L.
REv. 48 (1922) and 15 N.C.L. REv. 203 (1936).
"Collins v. rmn, 233 Miss. 636, 103 So. 2d 425 (1958) ; Milam v. Paxton, 160
Miss. 562, 134 So. 171 (1931); Howie v. Swaggard, 142 Miss. 409, 107 So. 556(1926) ; Fisher v. Kuhn, 54 Miss. 480 (1877) ; McGuire v. Stevens, 42 Miss. 724
(1869). Where the promisor has executed a will devising the property to the
promisee, it cannot subsequently be revoked. Johnston v. Tomme, 199 Miss. 337,
24 So. 2d 730 (1946). See Note, 18 Miss. L.J. 328 (1947).
'Burce v. Scruggs Equip. Co., 194 Tenn. 129, 250 S.W.2d 44 (1952) ; Goodloe
v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1906) ; Newman v. Carroll, 11 Tenn. 18(1832). r ,
Vest v. Searce s Adm r, 312 Ky. 181, 226 S.W.2f 942 (1950); Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 299 Ky. 738, 187 S.W.2d 282 (1945); Rudd v. Planters Bank & Trust
Co., 283 Ky. 351, 141 S.W.2d 299 (1940).
10 Bowling v. Bowling's Adm'r, 222 Ky. 396, 300 S.W. 876 (1927); Doty's
Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803 (1904) ; Benge v. Hiatt's
Adm'r, 82 Ky. 666 (1885).11 Miller v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Ky. 1960).
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North Carolina has consistently held that neither specific perform-
ance nor damages may be awarded on the oral contract to devise or to
convey realty.12 Although the contract itself is unenforceable, mone-
tary relief has been awarded on a quantunt ineruit basis in order to
prevent unjust enrichment where the promisee has performed.'5 If the
promisee's performance has been in the nature of services which were
capable of monetary evaluation, the measure of damages is the value
of the services. 14  Where the performance is incapable of monetary
evaluation, the North Carolina position is not clear. Redmon v.
Roberts15 presented facts alriost identical to those in the principal case.
There an illegitimate daughter brought suit against the estate of her
deceased father to recover on his oral promise to adopt her and to leave
her a part of his estate if the plaintiff's mother would not bring bastardy
proceedings against him. The court stated, in a dictum,' 6 that the
measure of damages would be the value of the property agreed to be
devised, and cited a Kentucky case as authority for the rule. In Hager
v. Whitener 7 the plaintiff moved his family to the deceased's home,
worked the land, and took care of the deceased in his old age in con-
sideration of the promise by the deceased to devise all of his property
to the plaintiff.'17 The court adopted the dictum in Redmon v. Roberts
and awarded the plaintiff the value of the land promised to be devised
although the services were apparently capable of monetary evaluation.
In a later case, Grantham v. Grantham,18 the plaintiff also rendered per-
sonal services in consideration of the deceased's oral promise to devise
realty. The court reversed its position taken in the Hager case, holding
that the promisee was entitled to the value of the services, but that the
"nGales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958) ; Jamerson v. Logan, 228
N.C. 540, 46 S.E.2d 561 (1948)2; Neal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 224 N.C.
103, 29 S.E.2d 206 (1944); Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331(1933) ; Ballard v. Boyette, 171 N.C. 24, 86 S.F. 175 (1915); Hall v. Fisher, 126
N.C. 205, 35 S.F. 425 (1900); East v. Dolihite, 72 N.C. 562 (1875); Albea v.
Griffin, 22 N.C. 9, (1838).
"'Jamerson v. Logan, supra note 12; Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45
S.E.2d 764 (1947) ; Daughtry v. Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27 S.E.2d 446 (1943).
Plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages even though there is no allegation or proof
as to the reasonable value of the services. Gales v. Smith, supra note 12.
" Stewart v. Wyrick, supra note 13 (plaintiff rendered services to and advanced
money in behalf of the deceased); Price v. Askins, 212 N.C. 583, 194 S.E. 284
(1937).15,198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E. 881 (1929).
18 The defendant failed to reserve the question for appeal so it was not before
the court.
-T204 N.C. 747, 169 S.E. 649 (1933).
IT' It has been held that such performances are not susceptible of monetary
evaluation. Walker v. Calloway, 99 Cal. App. 2d 675, 222 P.2d 455 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955); Hanson v. Urner, 206 Md. 324, 111 A.2d 649 (1954). The general rule,
however, is that such performances may be adequately compensated for in money.
Hays v. Herman, 213 Ore. 140, 322 P.2d 119 (1958) ; Gossett v. Harris, 48 S.W.2d
739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). See generally 49 Am. Jun. Statute of Frauds § 524(1943) ; Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 1101-05 (1936).
1-6205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933).
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value of the land might be admitted only as evidence to be considered by
the jury in determining the reasonable value of the services. In Gran-
tham, however, as well as in all of the later decisions in which the rule
of the Grantham case has been applied,19 the court has been concerned
with cases in which the performance by the promisee was capable of
monetary evaluation. Thus it is questionable whether the Grantham
decision would be a repudiation of the dictum in the Redmon case since
in Rednon the performance by the promisee was not capable of mone-
tary evaluation.
Should the Redmon dictum be applicable on its facts, the prior Ken-
tucky rule and the existing North Carolina rule would be the same.
This should add to the persuasiveness of the Kentucky decision. How-
ever, should our court decide that the Grantham rule applies also to the
cases in which the performance is not capable of monetary evaluation,
it is arguable that the North Carolina and prior Kentucky rules are
distinguishable. That is, whereas Kentucky awarded the value of the
land as damages, North Carolina has determined that the value of the
land is only evidence of the value of the performance. It has been
suggested that such a distinction is without substance because the jury
will ordinarily accept the standard set by the parties as the reasonable
worth of the performance by the promisee.20
In considering cases presenting facts similar to the instant case, two
questions are posed: "(1) whether the policy of the statute [in prevent-
ing fraud] is saved, and (2) whether there is something in the particu-
lar case that calls for dispensing with a formal compliance with the
statute, its policy being saved, and makes it more equitable to go forward
and complete what the parties have begun."'21 The Kentucky court
discerned the inconsistency of its answer to these questions. Its prior
decisions had required a strict adherence to the Statute in holding the
contract unenforceable. Yet, the court would, in effect, enforce the oral
contract by awarding damages measured by the terms of the contract.
Where the performance by the promisee is not susceptible of mone-
tary evaluation, there is no way to determine the value of the perform-
ance without accepting, or at least considering, the value set by the
parties themselves. Thus practicality requires dispensing with strict
"Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Jamerson v. Logan,
228 N.C. 540, 46 S.E.2d 561 (1948) ; Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d
764 (1947); Coley v. Dalrymple, 225 N.C. 67, 33 S.E2d 477 (1945) ;' Grady v.
Raison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E2d 760 (1944), Neal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
224 N.C. 103, 29 S.E2d 206 (1944); Daughtry v. Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27
S.E.2d 446 (1943); Price v. Askins, 212 N.C. 583, 194 S.E. 284 (1937); Lipe v.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 206 N.C. 24, 173 S.E. 316, aff'd on rehearing, 207 N.C.
794z 178 S.E. 665 (1935).
'4 PAGE, WILLS 895 (3d ed. 1941).
" Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919-Equity, 33 HARV. L. Rny. 929,
944 (1920).
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adherence to the Statute and admission of the terms of the oral contract
for the purpose of measuring damages. Since this does not violate the
policy and purpose of the Statute, it would seem more logical and equi-
table to award the specific thing promised rather than to attempt its
measurement in damages. In doing so, the statutory policy and purpose
would be preserved equally as well. It is submitted that the Kentucky
court has adopted- the preferable position.
J. LEVONNE CHAMBERS
Worknen's Compensation-Neutral Risks-Causal Relation
Between Employment and Injury.
The workman's compensation statutes of most states prescribe as
one of the requirements of compensability that an injury must "arise out
of" the employment' of the worker, thus demanding a causal relation
between the job and the injury. Professor Larson has adopted a useful
threefold classification of the tests employed by the courts to determine
if an injury meets this requirement. Risks are designated as personal,
job related and neutral.2 An injury resulting from personal risk is one
completely unrelated to the employment and therefore not compensable.3
The injury from a job related risk is strictly confined to the hazards of
employment and is always compensable. 4 The third category, neutral
risk, includes all risks not personal or job related.5 The establishment
of the causal relation, the "arising out of" the employment, is a difficult
problem in these neutral risk injuries. In determining compensability
in such cases the courts have used three theories-increased risk, actual
risk and positional risk. This note will examine each of these theories
and will attempt to determine the present position of North Carolina in
this area.
In Pope v. Goodsen6 a carpenter took shelter during a storm in a
partially completed building. He -vas wet from the rain and had a
nail pouch around his waist. As he stood near the window, lightning
struck the house, traveled down the window frame and passed through
1E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §97-2(6) (1958); S.C. CODE §72-14 (Supp. 1959); VA.
CODE ANN. § 65-7 (1950). Contra, N.D. REv. CODE § 65-0102(8) (1957) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 35-1-44 (1953). For a discussion of "arising out of," see Vause v.
Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951).
21 LAlsON, WoRxmEN's COMPENSATION § 7 (1952).
'Compensation was denied to an employee assaulted while working, where the
assault was motivated by domestic difficulties. Harden v. Thomasville Furniture
Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930).
'Compensation is so clearly appropriate that the issue is seldom litigated. For
"instance, if an operator of a saw were injured by a malfunction in that tool, the
risk is clearly job related.
'In neutral risks the cause of the harm may be known or unknown; this note
treats only the former type cases.6 249 N.C. 690, 107 S.E.2d 524 (1959).
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